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Spanish historiography has focused on studying the Spanish cotton industry rather than the 
companies belonging to it and has insisted on the idea that these companies were exogenously 
conditioned by problems such as the reduced size of the domestic market, the shortage of energy 
supply and a poor transport network. According to this literature, Spanish cotton companies were 
burdened by the increasing cost of money and forced to develop activities that were, in principle, 
unbecoming of them – such as marketing their products or financing the work of their commercial 
agents –, while suffering from the lack of financing mechanisms.1 However, issues such as the 
companies’ structure and typology, their economic and financial strategies, the role of culture, the 
belief system and the institutional framework in their development or the motivation behind the 
decisions of business-owning families have been neglected.2 
Most research works on Spanish cotton companies are elaborated from an economic history 
perspective rather than from a business history point of view because very few studies have yet 
incorporated, be it implicit or explicitly, a discipline-specific approach. Spanish literature has a 
precedent in the seminal work by Nadal and Ribas (1970) on the cotton textile firm La Rambla, 
later revised and expanded by Soler (1997).3 In this article the foundations were laid of how to 
study a factory, considering both its productive aspects (sales, production, machinery) and its 
financial ones (main aggregates and ratios). All subsequent research works have reproduced this 
scheme, which is more focused on the factory’s economic history than on the company’s history, 
and have mainly analysed the period that spans from the beginning of the 19th century to the first 
years of the 20th century.4 Businessmen biographies that sometimes include information concerning 
their firms are also available.5 Cabana (1993) offered a compendium of biographical details on 
factory owners, data on their companies’ history and a series of economic and financial references 
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to those factories.6 Ferrer (2009) analysed the economic and financial state of the cotton textile firm 
La España Industrial but does not go into further details.7 The works by Prat (2008a, 2008b, 2009a 
and 2009b) posed questions on the companies’ mechanisms to commercialise their products and 
finance their marketing activities and provided answers from a trade credit or industrial organisation 
perspective.8  
This research applies business history criteria, particularly those of the History of Family 
Business, because the company’s configuration as a family business is decisive in order to 
understand the strategies implemented, the growth of the sector it belonged to or the structure of the 
whole industry and has more relevance in this sense than the various institutional frameworks or the 
varying levels of social-economic development in each country.9 This article looks at the 
performance of companies within the Spanish cotton textile industry and explores the financial 
strategies employed by them to fulfil their objectives of keeping the management of the company 
within the family and achieving their survival in the long term. In order to reach these objectives, 
Spanish companies kept unaltered the core of their financial strategy, which was based on high 
percentages of equity capital and low levels of indebtedness, but they managed to make it more 
flexible whenever the economic circumstances, as during the First World War, recommended it.  
Finally, this work dismantles the negative Chandlerian vision according to which family 
businesses, given their characteristics, were doomed to fail in both making profits and becoming 
lucrative, tended to suffer short-term difficulties in order to survive in the long term and were often 
confronted with various conflicts whenever the next generation inherited the business from the 
founder (Buddenbrook syndrome) suffered from low profitability and had long-term survival 
problems, as even the most prosperous firms often ended up having trouble once the descendants of 
the firm’s founder took over (Buddenbrook syndrome).10 The work focuses on long-lasting 
companies – ignoring all changes in their legal names and in the legal forms they adopted – whose 
profits were in keeping with the evolution of Spanish economy, and describes their business 
strategy, which was founded on four pillars: risk aversion, a high percentage of equity capital, a low 
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level of indebtedness and the company’s organic growth. Risk aversion arose from family 
ownership, which impacted on the financial policies of the firms. As a consequence they shunned 
loan finance and reinvested profits, thereby accumulating reserves to fund organic growth. The 
paper investigates the consequences of these aspects of family ownership for firm level strategy and 
financial performance. In particular, it investigates the extent to which accumulation of reserves 
facilitated vertical integration and impacted on the financial performance of the firms, as well as 
whether risk aversion resulted in firms achieving satisfactory profit levels consistent with long-term 
survival, rather than engaging in short-term profit maximisation. 
From a chronological point of view, the starting point of this article is 1884, at the beginning 
of the last phase in the development of the cotton industry, but the research covers until the 
outbreak of the Spanish Civil War and is supported by the data of twelve cotton companies.11 Its 
first section presents the research hypothesis and the context of the family companies and places 
family businesses into context, explaining both their characteristics and objectives. The second 
section in this work examines the sources used in the research. The third section focuses on the 
strategy implemented by family firms, which can be considered “conservative” because it aimed to 
keep the company alive and under the control of the family. Once the objectives – longevity and 
family control – and the strategy are defined, the amount of return than can be attributed to them via 
profits and return on equity is calculated (fourth section). Profits underwent a period of relative 
stagnation between 1884 and 1936, with the exception of the First World War years, during which 
they reached extraordinary levels. The return on equity, on the contrary, did not show a similar 
behaviour, since the companies’ strategy of organic growth based on their equity capital led to a 
strong increase of these resources after the war, badly affecting profitability. Finally, three examples 
of the implementation of this business strategy are provided; they all show that the companies 
followed the same guidelines with only some minor discrepancies.  
1. Spanish family cotton companies 
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Spanish literature on the topic considers the Spanish cotton sector as a polarised structure in 
which a myriad of small firms surrounded a small core of large and medium-sized companies and 
located in an industrial district which was smaller than Lancashire. As important as the scope of the 
Spanish cotton sector – comparatively a small one – was its polarised structure, which showed a 
small core of medium-sized and large companies surrounded by a multitude of small firms. For 
instance, in 1900 the cotton spinning subsector was mostly (80.6 percent) in the hands of small 
enterprises with less than 5,000 spindles each, while 15.2 percent was managed by companies 
having between 5,000 and 10,000 spindles each and 4 percent corresponded to firms having more 
than 10,000 spindles each (only five of them had more than 20,000 machines). The structure of the 
weaving subsector was quite similar, for there were thirteen companies – each having more than 
300 looms – representing 30 percent of the overall national weaving production, while the 
remaining 69 percent corresponded to enterprises not having more than 50 looms each.12 
The Spanish cotton industry was mostly composed of firms the ownership and management 
of which were in the hands of one single family.13 To study the reality of a sector based on family 
enterprises entails, first of all, a debate on the very concept of family business. This debate is still 
alive in current business history literature and, consequently, there is no universally-accepted 
definition of the term.14 In an attempt to offer one, some business historians have focused on 
property and/or the management of the firm by certain family members. Others have defined the 
concept in relation to the degree in which the family is involved in the business and to the actual 
possibility of transferring the business to the next generation. Other historians have considered the 
percentage of capital under family control. There are more complex approaches that connect 
different aspects of the company’s reality in an attempt to reach a proper definition. A broad 
definition would entail the family’s retention of voting control over the strategic direction of the 
firm; a medium-range definition would consider the family’s retention of voting control plus the 
direct involvement of the family in day-to-day operations; and a narrow definition would require 
the family’s retention of voting control over the business and the involvement of multiple 
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generations of family members in the company’s daily operations. Business historians generally 
take the following three aspects into account in their studies: percentage of capital under family 
control, family control of the company’s management and intergenerational transfer of the 
business. With regard to this article, the definition that best suits the Spanish entrepreneurial 
framework while encompassing these three aspects is the one provided by Colli and Rose (2007: 
194),15 according to which a family business is one in which a family owns enough equity to be 
able to exert control over the company’s strategy while having at least two generations of family 
members involved in the top management positions of the firm.  
Second, the goals of family companies need to be specified. In general, family firms have 
two commonly accepted aims: to guarantee the survival of the firm and, therefore, allow its 
transmission to the next generation, and to keep it under the control of the family. The objective of 
maximising profits is subordinated to these first two aims. The first objective, the company’s 
longevity, is related to the fact that family firms invest a percentage of the family assets in the 
development of the business, sometimes even all of it, thus compromising the economic stability of 
the family. This is the reason why the company must, in the first place, achieve longevity as a 
mechanism to guarantee the preservation of the family assets; bankruptcy would bring ruin to the 
family. 
Third, all family firms are not equal and it is possible to differentiate dynastic family 
companies (a high percentage of family ownership and control) from non-dynastic family 
companies (a lower percentage of family ownership, not all management positions under the control 
of the family).16 Within the Spanish cotton industry, family companies with a significant dynastic 
component that emphasized their family business character were predominant.17 Despite an implicit 
belief in the loyalty of the next generation, founders often exhibited a highly personal, autocratic 
style of leadership, which indicated a lack of trust in the future. However, it was their offspring, 
trained extensively for the task, who in the end inherited the company rather than outside 
professional managers. The introduction of the dynastic component meant that the founder 
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conceived the business as a good that he aimed to preserve intact and transmit to subsequent 
generations. These future generations were understood as steps along the stairway of inheritance 
and were held responsible for perpetuating the company and possibly expanding it without 
substantially modifying its nature. Dynastic family companies demanded intergenerational loyalty 
in order to guarantee the intergenerational transfer of the firm. The fear of inefficient management 
led the founder to retain control of the company longer than it was actually required, so that the 
heirs took over the management later in their professional lives when they had accrued the human 
capital, age and experience considered essential for the correct guidance of the firm. As tradition 
wanted it, not only the family’s name needed to be upheld, but the business methods as well.18 The 
business culture of the firms here considered consisted of a set of values that were passed from 
generation to generation and completely internalised by the family owners, making far-reaching 
change difficult. Family business culture was therefore less elastic than the wider changes taking 
place in society, and placed restrictions on potential activity areas that could have represented a 
solution to the challenges posed by increasing foreign competition.19 
In a context of “personal capitalism” as the Spanish one at the end of the 19th century and 
during the first third of the 20th century, companies are understood in personal terms rather than in 
economic ones and are seen as goods to be preserved for the heirs; in this context, profit, equity 
reserves and capital accumulation cannot be ignored.20 Our hypothesis considers a family business 
as characterised by risk aversion. Risk aversion would even stop the undertaking of activities that 
fell out of the path traditionally marked by the founder to guarantee the company’s survival and 
consequently the family’s wellbeing –company and family thus standing as synonyms.21 Risk 
aversion was also directly related with the objectives of longevity, i.e. of guaranteeing the 
intergenerational transmission of the company, and family control. With the aim of reaching the 
above mentioned objectives, Spanish cotton-producing families chose a financial strategy for their 
businesses that was based on the important weight of their equity capital and on the maintenance a 
low level of indebtedness. 
7 
 
In this respect, Spanish historiography usually takes two different stances. The more 
traditional perspective maintains that the family companies’ decision not to resort to debt capital, 
except in small percentages, and to focus instead on their equity capital may have been reinforced 
by the economic framework within which they developed. Again, the literature on the topic insists 
on that Spanish cotton manufacturers, as compared to their British colleagues, were forced to 
assume the costs of financing the work of textile merchants, especially the Southern ones, so that in 
the end they became factory owners, merchants and bankers at the same time and their profitability 
consequently suffered from it. Two factors were responsible for the multifaceted condition of 
Spanish cotton businessmen: on the one hand, the country’s general backwardness – Spain was an 
agrarian, poor country with low levels of consumption – and, on the other, the lack of enough 
trading and financial institutions.22 A clear example of this situation was the case of Berenguer y 
Cía., which was a net creditor (the difference between its debtors and creditors was always positive) 
but acted as a bank for its clients by using its excess liquidity.23 
According to a new approach, European cotton industries showed a similar behaviour to that 
of the Spanish cotton sector. Processes aimed to vertically integrate production and marketing 
activities coexisted in them with the firms’ collaboration with great distribution and sales 
companies.24 In other words, the Spanish case was not anomalous within the European context, 
while Lancashire industrial district was in fact exceptional insofar as production and marketing 
were never vertically integrated by the companies established there.25 In addition, Spanish 
economic backwardness was not the only factor to explain the adoption of marketing mechanisms 
by the national cotton industry: the lesser size of the industrial district was also decisive of the 
manufacturers’ essential role in the process of commercialising their products.26 Finally, Spanish 
businessmen knew how to use their commercial network in order to promptly detect changes in the 
demand. Prat states that “manufacturers built their own commercial structures because they needed 
to have a foothold close to consumers, but not because of a lack of merchants”.27 
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The decision to guarantee both the companies’ stability and longevity postponed the 
maximisation of their profits and profitability. Nadal clearly expressed it (1988:45) when he 
discussed the characteristics of La Rambla’s managers: 
“Els socis d'una companyia industrial han d'oblidarse del que més tard s'ha anomenat 
la ‘maximització del benefici’ i fer una aposta de futur. Durar llarg és més important 
que guanyar diners.” 
(“The partners of an industrial company need to forget about what later on will be called 
“profit maximising” and invest in the company’s future. Lasting is more important than 
making money.”)28 
 
This perspective on business was typical not only of dynastic family companies, many of which 
were still bound by unlimited liability or had only recently been transformed into public limited 
companies. The case of La España Industrial, a family firm created as a public limited company 
and quoted on the stock market, is very significant. Its chairman, J.A. Muntadas, who may have 
been under greater pressure than other businessmen to achieve the profitability and dividends 
required to maintain the value of the shares, expressed himself in the following terms: 
 “Séame lícito añadiros, que el verdadero industrial, trabaja y se afana por algo más 
que por la remuneración de sus capitales. Ama el industrial su industria, con el propio 
entusiasmo que el artista su arte, que el literato la literatura”.29 
(“Let me add that a genuine industrialist works hard for something more than increasing 
his capital. He loves its industry with the same enthusiasm as an artist loves his art and a 
writer loves literature.”) 
 
In addition, the companies were the main source of stability in what concerns the income 
and wellbeing of business-owning families.30 Family revenues came from the salaries earned by the 
company’s managers, from the percentage of profits due – according to the company’s Articles of 
Association – to those family members who held a position in the board of directors and, finally, 
from the interests accrued on the interest-bearing accounts that they had in the company. Thus, the 
family, who controlled the management of the firm, was interested in preserving the company and 
guaranteeing its longevity rather than in risking strategies that could generate high profits in the 
short-term but also weaken the company’s financial situation in the longer term.31 This conservative 
behaviour was relatively comfortable and easy to defend because few were the shareholders – or 
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partners in non-public limited companies – to whom the company was accountable, and most of 
them belonged to the family.32 
The strategy aiming to guarantee the firm’s longevity was applied during the whole period 
analysed here, independently from the legal form adopted by the company.33 Operating as unlimited 
liability entities, business-owning families, for which the boundary between company and family 
was blurred, lived under a permanent threat of bankruptcy.34 In Spain, two were the legal forms 
generally preferred when founding a company: most businesses were general partnerships 
(constituted by a small number of partners whose assets were subject to the principle of unlimited 
liability through short-term contracts that could be extendable depending on the evolution of the 
firm) and the rest, to a much lesser extent, were limited partnerships (with one or more general 
partners who operated under the principle of unlimited liability and one or more limited partners 
who were only accountable for whatever amount they had contributed to the firm). Limited 
partnerships were constituted only when there was a need to mobilise great amounts of capital.35  
It took the Spanish cotton producers some time to transform their businesses into public 
limited companies despite the changes introduced in Spanish commercial laws (1829, 1848, 1865 
and 1885), meant to facilitate the incorporation of this legal form.36 It is true that, pushing in the 
other direction, fiscal policies had favoured the transference of the company within the family by 
including exceptions “for wealth transmitted to kinship in first degree (descendants)” in the 
Impuesto de Derechos Reales (Inheritance Tax, 1982).37 However, Spanish cotton firms (without 
losing any of their family essence) became public limited companies after the First World War.38 
And in spite of it, when the Catalan textile businesses became public limited companies in the 
1920s, their strategic behaviour remained the same, since the families still linked a significant 
percentage of their wealth to the development of their firms.39 
Finally, the contributions made by research works with firm accountability, scale and scope 
perspective are also considered.40 From this point of view, Spanish cotton textile companies moved 
within approximately the same parameters as British firms. They all concentrated capital ownership 
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in the hands of a clique of directors and most of the firms belonged to the same social networks and 
employers associations.41 In Catalonia, where most Spanish cotton companies were concentrated, as 
in Lancashire, these amalgamations exploited external economies of scope, involving little 
expansion of scale at plant level or integration of the production system. As Toms and Wilson 
(2003: 11) concluded, “this meant that where businesses did increase in size, they generally did so 
without diluting control to outside stakeholders”.  
This section has shown how the Spanish cotton sector was mostly formed by small and 
medium-sized family companies, where the families held control of the management and retained a 
significant part of the business for at least two generations. Longevity and control were the main 
objectives and, in order to achieve them, the families preserved the dynastic character of the 
companies’ values, business methods and culture and put stability before profit maximisation – 
their business strategies were always conservative, independently from the companies’ legal form. 
After describing the structure of the Spanish cotton sector and the characteristics and objectives of 
the companies belonging to it, the next section will analyse their business strategies with further 
detail. 
2. Sources and accounting methodology 
The sources that support this research are the balance sheets of twelve Spanish cotton 
companies Forcada, Sedó, Fabra, Valls, Viladomiu, Güell, Mata, Serra i Feliu, Almeda, La España 
Industrial, Berenguer i Cía. and La Rambla. The sources from where the data were taken are 
diverse. The data of La España Industrial were taken from Cabana (2001) and Ribas (1999); 
Cabana (2001) also provided those of Fabra.42 The data of La Rambla were found in Nadal and 
Ribas (1970) and Soler (1997).43 The balances of Berenguer i Cía. were first published by Ferrer 
(2009).44 The accounts of Forcada, Sedó, Fabra, Valls, Viladomiu, Mata, Serra i Feliu and Almeda 
were consulted at the Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya (National Archive of Catalonia).45 Finally, those 
of Colonia Güell were collected at the Arxiu Historic Comarcal de Manresa (Historical Local 
Archive of Manresa).46 
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A question that may arise is whether these companies are representative of the universe of 
small and medium-sized cotton textile companies operating in Spain and, more specifically, in 
Catalonia. Even if the number of companies analysed here is small, it is considered to be 
representative of the cotton sector because it combines both large and small enterprises – including 
some of the most important Spanish textile companies (La España Industrial) –, dynastic and non-
dynastic family businesses, unlimited liability firms and public limited companies quoted on the 
stock market. And, in all cases, at least three generations of the same family succeeded each other at 
the head of the company.47 
Regarding the analysis of the balance sheets, the methodology applied is the one designed 
by the Central Balance Sheet Data Office of the Bank of Spain. For each firm, the balances have 
been standardised by synthesizing them and reducing their data to the main asset (fixed and current) 
and liability entries (equity capital, long-term debt, short-term debt with financial cost and short-
term debt with no financial cost). Amortisations with a minus sign are reported as part of the fixed 
assets entry, even if most of the companies had already subtracted them from their fixed assets. To 
calculate the company’s equity capital the company’s capital, its equity reserves, provisions and 
annual retained earnings have been added up, and its retained losses have been subtracted.48  
The ratios used to show the degree of risk aversion are the percentage of equity capital to 
total resources and the ratio of indebtedness. The latter was calculated by simply adding up all 
liabilities (long-term and short-term debt, with and without financial costs) and dividing the final 
amount by the totality of equity capital.49 A complementary ratio was also taken into consideration: 
the ratio of indebtedness once the amounts lent by the owners and their families to the companies 
are deducted. In other words, current accounts and loans granted by the family owners were 
subtracted from the company’s long and short-term debts, with and without costs. The result was 
divided by the total amount of the company’s equity capital. Financial leverage is not incorporated 
into indebtedness because the information provided by the companies’ balance sheets includes 
neither earnings before interests and taxes nor earnings before taxes.  
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In this work, the behaviour of the return on equity is studied (hereinafter, return on equity 
and profitability are used as synonyms).50 This ratio was chosen because, first of all, it allows 
measuring the return on investment obtained by business-owning families, an indicator that can be 
calculated by dividing net distributable profits after interests and taxes by the company’s equity 
capital, which, instead of being distributed as dividends, are accumulated by the firm. In the second 
place, the return on equity is used because, as mentioned before, our sources do not provide any 
data on earnings before interests and taxes, and, therefore, economic profitability cannot be 
calculated. The third reason for using this ratio is that both Spanish literature on cotton companies 
and literature focused on the study of business profits use as well these two indicators (net profits 
and return on equity), thus making it easy to compare cotton companies with the country’s overall 
industrial framework.51  
The information missing in the different sources leaves us with some gaps that are almost 
impossible to fill, but that do not affect the main hypotheses of this article. Thus, although it is 
known that the companies had low levels of indebtedness (low financial leverage), the degree to 
which their return on equity was conditioned cannot be estimated since data are lacking on whether 
the ratios of economic profitability were above the cost of the debt. Theoretically, a high level of 
financial leverage is tolerable when the company enjoys high economic profitability. However, the 
companies under study belonged to a mature and “very crowded” sector where profits were not 
especially high and the profit/assets ratio was probably below the interest rate. This reality 
reinforced the argument that led the companies to resort to self-financing and fund their activities 
with their equity capital. Was it worth getting into debt and risking the viability of the company if 
profits were not high enough to meet loan obligations? Obviously, the families preferred to 
guarantee the longevity of their firms over taking unnecessary risks. In fact, as seen below, in 
periods of high profits (during the First World War) the companies increased their level of short-
term indebtedness, since they felt more able to meet the repayment of the commercial loans asked 
for. In general, self-financing their companies with their equity capital seemed a correct strategy for 
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a mature sector with minimum barriers to entry. For even if financial leverage might increase the 
profit, this might not compensate the risk of losing the company. Under normal circumstances, this 
was probably the most rational option for a low-profit Spanish cotton industry.  
Finally, the series of data presented under each family’s last name are the outcome of the 
activity of the consecutive business entities created by each family under different legal names and 
forms. In those times, business assets operated under the protection of legal forms that were created 
and dissolved according to the family’s circumstances and, more specifically, to the specific 
moment in the life of the company’s founder. Generally speaking, the companies were transformed 
from general partnerships into limited partnerships before finally becoming public limited 
companies. Certain small discrepancies may be perceived in the process of linking the data of two 
consecutive companies belonging to the same family, especially when trying to match the final 
balance sheet of one company with the initial inventory of the following. For instance, the strong 
fluctuations of the companies’ equity capital (Valls and Berenguer) were due to the successive 
company changes within the family business because, at the time of a firm’s liquidation, the 
partners distributed a percentage of the retained earnings that had been accumulated as part of the 
company’s equity capital (usually under the heading of “capital”). Thus, the newly founded firm 
began its activity having a smaller amount of equity capital than the recently liquidated company, 
with the compensation of an increment of indebtedness.52 In cases such as those of Serra and 
Berenguer, the company’s equity capital was calculated by adding up the paid-up capital and the 
partners’ accounts in the company, given that the retained earnings were kept in those accounts. For 
instance, in 1917 Serra’s paid-up capital increased from 335,000 to 1.3 million pesetas. This 
amount matched the one that had been accumulated in the partners’ accounts as part of the firm’s 
liabilities. That year the family accounts disappeared from the company’s balance sheet. 
3. The strategy: risk aversion and low indebtedness 
In order to guarantee the survival of their companies, Spanish cotton producers at the end of 
the 19th century and during the first third of the 20th century, continued to apply the old financial 
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strategy based on the relevance of the company’s equity capital and a low level of indebtedness. 
Figure 1 reflects the evolution of the companies’ average percentage of equity capital to total 
liabilities in Spanish firms and how equity capital constantly represented 60 to 80 percent of the 
companies’ total balance from 1884 to 1935. This high percentage of equity capital in Spanish 
companies was destined to provide the firms with enough financial strength to face negative 
economic cycles and to enjoy a wide margin of financial autonomy.53  




Generally speaking, family enterprises – and cotton firms were no exception in this sense – 
were reluctant to external financing, both in the long and the short term.54 Spanish cotton companies 
differed from their European counterparts, not in the use of their equity capital, but in the intensity 
of that use, because Spanish firms used their equity capital not only to finance their fixed assets and 
most of their current assets, especially their own clients but also, in many cases, their current 
liabilities and even their particular trade creditors.55 Thus, the percentage of financing from external 
sources required by Spanish cotton companies was low and, as shown below, was concentrated in 
short-term liabilities. 
 The concept of debt capital in the case of Spanish cotton textile companies deserves to be 
clarified since not all of that capital actually derived from external sources. First of all, a very high 
percentage of it came from the current accounts that the owning families had in their companies. 
These were often interest-bearing current accounts (at a 3 to 5 percent rate) and served to face short-
term financing needs. Second, if the companies required financing in the medium or long term they, 
in the first place, applied for the loans that the partners themselves could offer and, as a second 
option, looked for funds within the social network of business-owning families.56 Thanks to this 
double option, Spanish cotton textile companies, like their British counterparts years before, 
covered a very high percentage of their short-term financing needs with family funds, thus eluding 
the financing system.57 Banks were only used to provide the necessary mechanisms for international 
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operations; with this aim, the companies opened sight accounts in foreign currencies, and some of 
them even did it in foreign banks.58  
Figure 2. Ratios of indebtedness 
 
 
Figure 2 reflects the ratio of indebtedness and the ratio of indebtedness once the partners’ 
accounts are deducted. Generally speaking, both ratios show that the companies had a low level of 
indebtedness, something predictable given the preponderance of equity capital, and show as well 
how the level rose during the expansive phases of the cotton sector: the years prior to the 1898 war 
and the 1914-1920 period. Once the resources of partners and families are deducted, the ratio of 
indebtedness connects with the hypothesis suggested by Tafunell (1998b).59 This hypothesis stated 
that the reduction in the activity of Catalan financial entities was partly due to the fact that their 
services were rarely used by business companies. The consumption goods industry and, within it, 
the cotton industry were indeed particularly reluctant to resort to these financial institutions. 
The results of the ratio of indebtedness for the 1900-1906 period are upwardly distorted 
because it was only possible to include six firms (four in the 1903-1904 period) in the calculation. 
In those years, the percentage represented by Serra – the most indebted firm (0.83) – dragged the 
average upwards, and thus this period seems the phase with higher business indebtedness. However, 
Annexe 1 shows that the other companies – Almeda (0.13), Berenguer (0.21) and Sedó (0.37) – had 
a much lower ratio of indebtedness during those years; therefore, the main hypothesis – the low 
level of indebtedness of Spanish cotton companies – remains valid. Furthermore, the low and stable 
ratio of indebtedness once the partners’ accounts are deducted confirms this hypothesis.60 
During the First World War and the immediate post-war period, the orthodox financial 
strategy applied until recently enjoyed a flexibility that was unknown to the Spanish cotton business 
culture. Through the war years, the companies increased their levels of production and marketing 
activities, profiting from the opening of the international markets – hardly accessible before – and 
from the vanishing of a great number of foreign competitors; however, they had to confront the 
difficulties associated to shortages in the supply of raw materials and intermediate inputs, and to 
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constant risks in transportation.61 The commercial expansion of the cotton industry was based on 
exports, which rose from an average of 6 thousand tons in 1910-1914 to an average of 16 thousand 
tons in 1915-1919. In other words, cotton exports increased by an annual average of 2.5 percent, 
and 70 percent of them had Europe as their final destination.62  
To meet the needs of a more intense industrial activity, a greater volume of raw materials, 
stocked products, commercial operations, etc. was required. The companies saw how their demand 
of current assets increased.63 The new – strictly commercial – financing needs in the short term led 
businessmen to apply a temporary strategy that resorted to debt capital in order to face those needs, 
but with the peace of mind of knowing they had the backing of rising profits (Table 1) allowing 
them to meet loan obligations. Their decisions led to a reduction of the percentage of the firms’ 
equity capital, which, in some cases, dropped 40 percent, reaching overall minimum levels in all 
cases, while a parallel increment of the ratios of indebtedness (Figure 2), which reached their 
maximum values, was taking place. However, financial stability was in no case put at risk.64 It was 
during the last war years and the post-war period when the companies were most indebted, their 
ratios reaching an average of 0.62 and 0.65 in 1919 and 1920, respectively. Most companies present 
their maximum ratios in that period, as in the case of Sedó (1.17 in 1918 and 1.15 in 1919), Valls 
(1.29 in 1919 and 2.59 in 1920), or Forcada (1.36 in 1921).65 Nevertheless, the ratios of 
indebtedness decrease considerably if the financing from the families, which represented a very 
relevant percentage of the companies’ financing, is deducted. Sedó’s ratio was thus 0.69 in 1918 
and 1919, Valls’ 1.29 in 1919 and 1.84 in 1920 and Forcada’s 0.47.66 
The companies understood the end of the First World War and the post-war period as the 
right moment to invest in new installations and machinery (fixed assets), by way of organically 
financing them with their equity capital.67 In general, most firms behaved the way Nadal (1998:77) 
explained in his description of the Sedó family business.68 The companies’ expansion was financed 
without actually questioning the orthodox philosophy of the family business: the company’s equity 
capital was increased, most often by expanding the capital subscribed by the owning family. Ribas 
17 
 
(1999: 1.132) showed that La España Industrial operated in a similar way and financed the 
modernisation of its business and financial structures with the non-distributed profits accumulated 
since 1919.69 There were some extreme cases such as that of Berenguer y Cía., which in the 1920s 
financed its investments with its equity capital, profiting from its position as creditor.70 At the end 
of that decade, most companies’ equity capital had recovered their pre-war percentage rates and 
their ratio of indebtedness had become almost irrelevant.71 
It is worth pointing out that on quite a few balance sheets the companies’ payable debt 
appeared to be zero (Annexe 2). The structure of the debt is also worth examining. It was mostly 
short-term debt, long-term debts being contracted on very few occasions. For instance, Forcada, 
Viladomiu and Berenguer did not recur to long-term indebtedness at all. Mata and Sedó did it only 
in the first years after their constitution as general partnerships. Valls and Güell (Figure 3), which 
accumulated the greatest percentages of long-term debt, were an exception. In the successive 
companies owned by the Valls family, long-term financing was a resource used only in the years 
immediately following a change in their name or legal form. Each of Valls’ firms was, at the 
beginning, heavily financed with long-term debt capital, but the proportion of long-term debt 
diminished at the same pace the company’s equity capital incremented. As for Colonia Güell S.A., it 
was one of the quoted companies on the Barcelona stock market. The firm was founded in 1920 
with an initial capital of 3.5 million pesetas and the same amount in shares within the portfolio 
(receivable). In 1924, the company’s capital had reached the amount of 12 million pesetas 
complemented by an issuance of long-term mortgage-backed bonds with a value of 6.5 million 
pesetas. In 1935, the financing was completed with a mortgage loan worth 0.5 million pesetas. This 
capital was destined to cover the investments in machinery and new buildings made by the 
company in the mid-1920s, just at the end of the expansive cycle provoked by the outbreak of the 
First World War. Colonia Güell S.A. accumulated the greatest long-term debt and its achievements 
were limited by the distribution of low dividends until 1933. 




4. The consequences of the strategy: profits and profitability  
With this conservative mentality manifested through the double objective of “preserving” 
both the company in the long term and the family’s control over it, the decision to maintain a high 
percentage of equity capital in order to guarantee financial stability had a direct effect on the return 
on equity. The return on equity can be calculated by dividing the company’s net distributable profits 
after interests and taxes by its equity capital. Any increase of the company’s equity capital resulted 
in a decrease of its return on equity, unless profits grew at the same pace. In general, a high 
percentage of equity capital represents a heavy weight on the firm’s return on equity.72 The fact that 
there is a close relation between equity capital, profits and return on equity makes it not only 
relevant to know how the return on equity behaved but mandatory to observe how business profits 
evolved.73  
Table 1. Profits of the Spanish cotton companies (millions of 1995 current pesetas) 
Profits expressed in constant pesetas reflect the companies’ revenues in real terms and 
eliminates extreme peaks originated by uncontrolled rises in the prices (as during the First World 
War). The data can be chronologically distributed into four phases.74 During the first phase, 
covering until 1890, profits were moderate due to the impact of the first Cuban insurrection and the 
fin-de-siècle crisis; the companies suffered from an accumulation of conflicts. Three public limited 
companies disappeared in those years: La Industrial Cotonera (1877), La Igualadina Cotonera 
(1880) and, a few years later, La Fabril (1892). The idea that other strategies, different from the one 
described here, must have caused their extinction can be put forth. Specialised literature generalises 
the situation of the larger companies to the whole cotton textile sector: “ja que molts altres de m’es 
petites dedicades tamb’e als filtas i teixits de cotó a les mateixes poblacions de Reus, Igualada, Vic 
o Barcelona patiren mals semblats” (“since many others, smaller ones, specialised as well in cotton 
spinning and weaving in the towns of Reus, Igualada, Vic or Barcelona suffered from similar 
troubles”).75 However, it is very likely that the financial structure of the smaller companies 
resembled the one described in this work, a fact that may have been enough for them to survive. 
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The second phase started with the implementation of protectionist policies by the Spanish 
government and it seemed to announce a bright future for cotton textile companies. These 
companies immediately began to rely upon the protectionist measures applied to the domestic 
market and upon their exclusive rights in the colonial market.76 Nevertheless, profits first decreased 
and then stagnated due to several factors. Activity in this period was soon weighed down by the 
second colonial insurrection (1895-96), the war against the United States of America and the loss of 
the colonies in 1898 which coincided with an agrarian crisis at the turn of the century. Production 
costs were mounting (raw materials and energy), the price of manufactured products escalated and 
export difficulties increased.77 The industrial sector tried to defend itself in a saturated domestic 
market – characterised by the contraction and inflexibility of the demand – by taking advantage of 
the protectionist policies introduced by the Spanish government. However, in the case of cotton 
products, these measures did not translate into higher prices that would have allowed greater profits 
because small and medium-sized cotton companies developed their activities within a competition 
regime.78  
The third phase comprises the years during the First World War and the immediate post-war 
period. In those years, profits greatly increased thanks to a strong export expansion (supra) linked 
to the advantages that a world at war offered to the cotton textile industry.79 The extraordinary 
profits grew progressively from 1914 onwards and reached a peak in 1922.  
The fourth and final phase lasted until the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (1936) and 
showed a trend leading to profit stagnation at almost pre-First World War levels. Once this war was 
over, both the factors that favoured the industry and the problems that affected it reappeared with 
greater intensity: excess capacity, falling prices, increasing world production, growing competition 
of man-made fibres, difficulties caused by competition in the international market.80 The Cambó 
Tariff (1922) represented a turning of the screw for Spanish protectionism, but it proved insufficient 
to safeguard the industry’s interests. In addition, the crisis of the 1930s pushed the sector against the 
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wall.81 In 1930, the Comité Regulador de la Industria Algodonera (Regulation Committee of the 
Cotton Industry) described the situation as follows: 
“El malestar de nuestra industria algodonera obedece en parte al natural reflejo de la 
crisis general que afecta a dicha industria. Descienden los precios de las manufacturas 
y se estrechan los márgenes con respecto a las materias primas además del exceso de 
producción”82 
(“The unease of our cotton industry is partly a natural reflection of the general crisis 
affecting the industry. Manufacture prices decrease and margins are narrowed in 
relation to raw materials, and there is, in addition, an excess of production.”) 
 
Spanish literature on the topic states that occasional upturns in this period, especially in the 
1930s, were related to a modest reactivation of the domestic demand connected to a favourable 
agrarian situation in specific years (1932 and 1934) and to the improvement of real salaries during 
the period of the Spanish Second Republic. It also insists that the growth of production until 1935 
proves that the sector’s pessimistic view was unjustified.83 However, the increment of production 
does not mean that profits increased in the same proportion. Profits showed a high annual volatility 
and a great dispersion between companies, but it did not break the decreasing trend that was evident 
since 1922. Finally, Spain’s growing political instability hindered profit recovery and contributed to 
the losses suffered by some of the companies after 1934. 
Figure 4. Return on equity of the cotton sector and the consumption goods industries 
 
 
The return on equity of the cotton industry behaved similarly to its profits; its values were 
below those of profits only since the mid-1920s. Figure 5 reinforces the commonly accepted vision 
according to which the profitability of the cotton sector was lower than that of the whole Spanish 
industry. Between 1884 and 1935, few were the years in which the cotton sector was triumphant 
when compared to other national consumption goods industries. The years previous to the second 
Cuban insurrection and the subsequent war against the United States were an exception. 
Profitability reached a peak of 14 percent in 1892, but thenceforth the decline was evident until it 
hit a low in 1900. A long lethargic period started then that lasted until 1914 during which 
profitability remained at a 5 percent level.84 The First World War, as previously mentioned, opened 
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an extraordinary phase in the growth of Spanish industrial profitability, particularly in the case of 
the cotton industry. However, the spectacular results achieved in this sector in the year 1922 
represented a real swan song. The strong reduction of profitability after 1923 is related to two 
factors meeting in time. On the one hand, the period of extraordinary profits stimulated by the war 
and the dislocation of the world markets had come to an end; on the other hand, the companies 
started a process of financial reinforcement based on the increase of their equity capital in order to 
generate enough reserves to overcome the profit fall – including losses – during the 1930s (supra).85 
Differences can be pointed out between Spanish, British and Italian family firms, all of them 
worried to strengthen financially, and the public limited companies of the Oldham district, which 
applied a profit distribution policy that led to their final decapitalisation.86 
Spanish financial results show some discrepancies with the British results at the 
chronological level, all of which are caused by the exposure of the sector to the particular 
commercial cycle of each country. Thus, while Spanish companies underwent a quite positive phase 
before the outbreak of the colonial war and then became lethargic until the First World War started, 
British firms experienced exactly the opposite. Nevertheless, data from the post-war boom and 
slump period show an almost identical evolution in both countries.87 Table 1 summarises the return 
on equity data of Spanish cotton companies. It is unnecessary to analyse the details here; it will be 
enough to point out how some of these companies achieved impressive return on equity rates 
between 1914 and 1922 – reaching peaks of 50 percent (Güell in 1922) – and how the period of 
prosperity during the war was followed by years of decaying return on equity – the values were 
negative after 1934 – due mostly to a strong increase of the ratio’s denominator, the companies’ 
equity capital.  
Table 2. Return on equity of the Spanish cotton companies and average return on equity of 
the cotton sector and the consumption goods industries 
 
 Three relevant cases of financial strategy  
The following examples prove how financial strategies determined the behaviour of 
profitability. Figures 5, 6 and 7 reflect the evolution of each company’s equity capital, profits in 
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constant pesetas and profitability in three different cases: La España Industrial, Sedó and Valls. 
Each of them has its own interesting particularity. La España Industrial was the only cotton 
company, of the ones here analysed, that, being a family firm, had not a dynastic component; it was 
soon transformed into a public limited company that was quoted on the stock market during the 
whole period studied. Both Sedó and Valls were family firms with a dynastic component that 
maintained their original characteristics even when they were transformed into public limited 
companies after the First World War. The difference between them lies in that Sedó operated almost 
without any long-term payable debt and Valls was the company with the greatest percentage of 
long-term payable debt.  
Figure 5. La España Industrial 
 
The strategy of La España Industrial is absolutely clear. Even if the company was quoted on 
the stock market, it still preserved the characteristics of a non-dynastic family business: the 
Muntadas family kept a relevant percentage of the business’ shares and members of several 
generations occupied management positions at the head of the company. The company’s 
investments, modernisation and growth permanently depended on its equity capital.88 Profits in 
absolute terms remained stable between 1884 and 1914, exception made of a peak before the second 
Cuban insurrection. Steady profits and a lack of expansion of the company’s equity capital helped 
stabilise the return on equity at 6 percent, a ratio that was a bit higher than the ROCE enjoyed by 
Fielden Brothers Ltd.89  
In relation to the companies’ objective to guarantee their longevity, it is possible to point out 
a relevant strategic difference between a family firm and one that is not, even when both are public 
limited companies. For instance, the managers of Osborne, a closed private company and one of the 
Oldham Limiteds, chose to distribute dividends – instead of capitalising the company and 
reinvesting in new technologies – not only because that was the shareholders’ wish but also to 
increase their own revenues. The shareholders of Werneth, an open public company in the same 
district, were more interested in compensating the risks that had been taken by distributing 
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dividends.90 La España Industrial, in opposition, implemented a dividend distribution strategy with 
the objective of preserving its financial solidness; consequently, the company’s equity capital 
remained stable above 90 percent until the First World War.91 After the First World War, the 
managers of this Spanish firm used the huge profits gained during the war period to increase the 
company’s capital and to accumulate equity reserves. Considering that, at the same time, profits 
started to decline – a trend that was to become permanent – this strategy led to the collapse of the 
company’s return on equity.92 
Figure 6: Sedó 
 
 
By looking at the data of the companies owned by the Sedó family it is easy to realise that 
their business strategy was far more conservative than the one implemented by La España 
Industrial. From 1884 to 1901, while the company was conformed as a general partnership under 
the name A. Sedó y Cía., a phase of profit growth derived into an almost immediate increment of the 
company’s equity capital, consequently provoking the deterioration of the return on equity. This 
increase of the company’s equity capital, based on a great expansion of the company’s own capital 
from 2 to 5 million pesetas, was meant to finance the construction of the Cairat water reservoir and 
the introduction of new machinery.93 
The gap between 1901 and 1902 is explained by the foundation of L.A. Sedó en Comandita, 
which represented a change in the legal form of the company. Between 1902 and 1936, the new 
company belonging to the Sedó family implemented the same strategy applied by its predecessors 
and maintained later on by the future company, Sedó S.A. It augmented the allocation of equity 
capital in the year following that on which profits increased. Sedó was among those companies that 
benefited the most from the First World War period, when it became an important supplier of 
corduroy, a fabric that was greatly in demand for the production of military uniforms.94 Once the 
euphoria around the world conflict was over, the company adjusted its balance sheet in 1924, 
cutting it down by 50 percent, something which caused a significant reduction of the company’s 
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equity capital. However, if considered proportionally, the company’s equity capital still represented 
70 percent of its liabilities.95 When profits were consolidated in 1925, the company expanded its 
capital by 50 percent – as in previous occasions – in order to finance its investments in machinery 
and new installations as well as to cover the increasing needs of industrial and commercial current 
assets associated to the expansion of production. The right decision on investment was supported by 
the achievement of profits that were higher than the ones obtained before the war – those of the war 
period had an extraordinary character – and allowed, reaching a ratio of profitability over 10 percent 
between 1922 and 1935, doubling that of the pre-war period and exceeding the average of the 
different cotton enterprises (Table 2).  
Figure 7 reflects the series of data corresponding to the different companies founded by the 
Valls family: Esteban Valls y Cía. (1878-1900), I. Valls i Pallerda (1900-1918), Valls i Mir en 
Comandita (1919-1920) and, finally, Manufacturas Valls S.A (1920). The first company created by 
Esteban Valls achieved one of the highest levels of profitability within the cotton sector (between 
ten and twenty percent) and, as in other firms, it reached a peak right before the final colonial 
insurrection. The succeeding company, Valls i Pallerda, launched a very important expansion of its 
equity capital in 1907, which, added to a phase of limited profit, led to a reduction in profitability. 
The former level of profitability was only recovered when the allocation of equity capital was 
reduced during the First World War period. 
Figure 7. Valls 
 
 
The data on Figure 7 do not include those of Valls i Mir en Comandita because of their 
exceptional character. This firm served as a bridge between the previous general partnerships 
belonging to the Valls family and the public limited company Manufacturas Valls S.A. In 1919 and 
1920, the profitability of Valls i Mir en Comandita soared to 200 and 133 percent, respectively; 
including these data would totally distort the chart. In those years, profitability was boosted by the 
extraordinary profits, which reached, respectively, 750,000 and 532,000 pesetas. In 1920, the family 
founded Manufacturas Valls S.A. that still operated under the paradigm of the dynastic family 
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business. This public limited company incorporated into its equity capital that of Valls i Pallerda, 
plus the profits generated by Valls i Mir. Standing on this base, in 1928 Manufacturas Valls S.A. 
launched an ambitious operation to expand its capital – it actually increased from 1.8 million 
pesetas that year to 5 million pesetas in 1930. The purpose was to finance the growth of the 
company’s fixed assets and part of the current assets required after the increment of the company’s 
activity.   
Conclusions 
This work contributes with a new perspective on Spanish cotton textile companies by 
showing how their behaviour was totally consistent with their nature. Their strategies and decisions 
were similar to those of their European counterparts, with no special differentiating features. There 
were no outstanding differences between dynastic (the majority) and non-dynastic (La España 
Industrial) companies, between unlimited liability firms and public limited companies, between 
companies that were quoted on the stock market (La España Industrial) and companies that were 
not (the rest of the public limited companies). Both European and Spanish family cotton companies 
shared the same objectives (longevity and family control) and implemented the same strategies 
based on organic growth, reinvestment of profits and overuse of their equity capital to finance fixed 
investment and much of the current assets required. They were all reluctant to external financing. If 
any, the difference between Spanish and other European companies may lie in the greater use of 
their equity capital on the part of the Spanish firms due to the country’s economic backwardness. 
In the period that goes from 1884 to 1936, the financial decisions of Spanish cotton 
companies experienced no innovations whatsoever. Their short-term strategy was defined within 
the parameters of low indebtedness, the use of the family’s patrimony to finance current assets and 
a high proportion of equity capital. A strategy that was labelled as “conservative” because it aimed 
to preserve the company and keep it under the control of the family. This strategy was certainly 
reinforced by the family’s decision to increase the percentage of equity capital after each phase of 
profit growth. This behaviour was similar to that of other Spanish industrial companies, which, after 
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achieving high profits during the First World War period, undertook “a not the least intense and 
sustained capitalisation process”.96 
On the other hand, this work has intended to measure the cost of implementing this strategy. 
It was not the profits but the return on equity that suffered the most because of it. Spanish 
companies’ profits improved during the brief period prior to the second Cuban insurrection, 
stagnated at the end of the century, when protectionist policies were firmly implemented in Spain, 
experienced a boom that lasted from the outbreak of the First World War to 1922 – a splendid year 
for most firms – and returned to pre-war levels during the second half of the 1920s and in the 
1930s. 
However, the analysis of the return on equity needs to go beyond the mere value of the ratio, 
because this indicator is conditioned by the amount of profits generated and by the evolution of the 
company’s equity capital. While profits depended greatly on the economic situation, equity capital 
evolved strictly according to the business strategy implemented. The owning families’ decision to 
stand financially on their equity capital – in what regards both their fixed assets and an important 
percentage of their current assets – affected the behaviour of the return on equity in each of them. 
Thus, the traditional perspective that finds the causes for the companies’ low profitability outside 
the firms’ own functioning, in the overall bad economic circumstances, Spain’s economic 
backwardness and the chronological sequence of political problems, needs to be diluted. It is true 
that the depressive situation at the end of the 19th century and then again during the 1930s led to a 
drop-off in profits, but it is also true that the progressive increment of the company’s equity capital 
had an almost similar effect on the decrease of the return on equity. The families assumed the risk 
of sacrificing a high percentage of their potential profitability in order to secure the survival of their 
companies, reinforcing their conservative strategies as the economic-institutional context on which 
they operated grew increasingly unstable.   
Three examples of the implementation of those business strategies have been provided in 
this article. All three of them show that the companies applied the same principles with just some 
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minor discrepancies. Thus, La España Industrial, although quoted on the stock market, stayed 
within the typical parameters of all family firms in this sector and, in the 1920s and 1930s, heavily 
weighed down its profitability by increasing its equity capital at the same time the company’s 
profits fell. Sedó and Valls were two faces of the same coin: both companies put all their hopes on 
their organic growth, something which handicapped their profitability, but while the former’s 
profits remained stable, the latter’s somehow increased. 
The outcome was that Spanish cotton companies have survived under the control of the 
families that owned them from their foundation until the end of the 20th century, covering the time 
span of four or five generations and, therefore, growing apart from the well-known and often 
mentioned “Buddenbrook syndrome”.  
Finally, this article clarifies the traditional vision of Spanish specialised literature that 
underlined the importance of exogenous aspects associated to Spanish economic backwardness in 
determining the companies’ behaviour. According to that approach, the companies’ strategy was not 
chosen freely. However, this article places the decisions of Spanish cotton companies on equal 
footing with those of their European counterparts, which, in spite of developing their activities 
within different economic and institutional frameworks, nevertheless implemented almost identical 
strategies. Generally speaking, it seems the behaviour of Spanish firms did not diverge from that of 
other European family businesses, except for the greater intensity in the use of the companies’ 
equity capital in Spain.97 In other words, the family and mostly dynastic nature of both European 
and Spanish cotton textile companies – characterised by its low levels of transparency in what 
concerns the company’s accounts and by its scale and scope externalities – weighed much more 
than all the exogenous factors related to Spanish economic backwardness when it came to choose 
the financial strategy of the firm. Exogenous factors intensified the companies’ original features 
(the greater percentage of equity capital) but did not directly determine their strategy. 
Annexe 1. Ratio of indebtedness 
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